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ABSTRACT: Based on a comprehensive theoretical model we investigate the 
determinants of government spending.  Besides GDP, commonly associated with either 
Walra´s law or Keynesian macro stabilization policies, we consider some variables identified 
with the public choice approach, namely median voters, pressure groups and the ideology 
of the government in power.  These other variables are women, elderly population and 
population occupied in agriculture.  The model is tested empirically using Johansen´s 
cointegration technique for the cases of Australia and Canada with data on general 
government expenditure, thus covering all government sectors, including social security. 
For the most part, we find long-run relationships among the variables and with the 
expected signs.  
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1.  Introduction 
At least since Adolph Wagner (1835-1917) many economists offered valuable 
theoretical and empirical contributions for the explanation of ever-increasing government 
expenditures.  The well-known Wagner´s law of increasing state activity establishes that 
government expenditures increase more than proportionally to GDP both in absolute and 
relative terms.  The reason why it is not a theory lies in the fact that it does not set a causal 
relationship from GDP growth to government spending.  Rather, it merely recognizes a 
positive statistical association between those two variables.  However, a substantial number 
of the literature that undertook its empirical testing (Abizadeh and Gray (1985),Bairam 
(1992), Bird (1971),Bohl (1996), Courakis, Moura-Roque and Tridimas (1993), Gandhi (1971), 
Goffman and Mahar (1971), Henrekson (1993), Lin (1995), Mann (1980), Murthy (1993), 
Nagarajan and Spears (1990), Oxley (1994), Payne and Ewing (1996), Ram (1992), Wahab 
(2004) and others) assumes that government spending is endogenous.  If that is so, then 
Wagner´s law is supported whenever the estimated coefficient on GDP is positive and 
greater than one.  Not surprisingly, the empirical outcomes, based on a considerable 
variety of functional forms, data specifications, country and selected time periods, data 
sources and econometric methods of different degrees of technical sophistication, 
provided contradictory results. Whereas some found evidence supporting it, others did not.  
In any case, the interpretation of the law itself is controversial with respect, for example, to 
the countries to which it validly applies and to the expenditures to be included under the 
notion of government spending.  Peacock and Scott (2000) emphasize the idea that it 
solely applies to emerging industrial societies, not being therefore applicable to modern 
developed countries; on the other hand, all expenditures ought to be considered no 
matter the government level, central, federal, or local, that undertakes them.  Furthermore, 
the above stated principle of inclusion fully applies to public enterprises. 
Keynesians see the functional relationship between these same two variables under 
a different perspective.  Now, public spending is a policy variable whose level is chosen by 
government officials as a counter-cyclical instrument designed to stabilize important 
economic variables in the short-run, such as GDP and employment. In so being, GDP 
becomes an exogenous variable that negatively determines public spending.  In this 
framework, a line of discussion and research is to assess if government expenditures are 
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the view that public spending is detrimental to economic development due to the large 
share of transfer payments in its composition. 
The various contributions to explaining the secular expansion of public spending are 
usually structured in two groups of theories.  On the one hand, we have the so-called 
demand based theories and, on the other hand, the supply based theories.  Due to their 
relationship with the political decision-making process, Holsey and Borcherding (1997) 
prefer to name them, respectively, of political and non-political theories even though it is 
not clear for us that some of the contributions placed under the non-political group are 
indeed entirely of a non-political nature.  The first category stresses the role of electors that 
demand more and more services from the state at any level and which politicians agree to 
provide since they are motivated by their own reelections.  Differently, for the second 
group of theories, the expansion of the state is self-generated by inefficiencies of the public 
sector in comparison to the rest of the economy (Baumol, 1967), and by the pressure 
exerted by self-interested politicians and bureaucrats who aim at improving their own 
welfare at the state´s expense.   
Public choice theory has an enormous influence in all this literature.  Fiscal illusion 
(Oates, 1988), the decisive influence of the median voter under majority rule (Black, 1958), 
pressure groups (Olson, 1965; Becker, 1983; Peltzman, 1976, 1989), the political manipulation 
of the business cycle (Alesina, 1987,1989,1995,1997; Nordhaus, 1975), the bureaucrats 
(Niskanen, 1971, 1975, 1994) and, in general, Buchanan´s Leviathan (Buchanan, 1975).   
Under this general framework, we have abundant specific contributions. One of them is by 
Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981, 1983) who stress the idea that income distribution is 
skewed to the right such that median income is lower than average income and, in so 
being, the concentration of votes on population with incomes below average stimulates 
redistribution from high-income voters to low income individuals.  This would explain both 
increasing public spending as well as its tendency towards a rising share of unproductive 
transfer payments.  Some authors go a little further in this respect when they identify 
particular social groups that, in their view, exert a decisive influence on social choices.  For 
Becker and Mulligan (1998) for example, the increasing electoral influence of elderly 
population is a main force driving up public spending, whereas for Lott and Kenny (1999) 
women  are indeed the most important influence in that respect.  Since the twenty´s of the 
20th century women have gained substantial political influence, not only due to the fact 
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integration in the labor market made them an increasingly independent social and 
political group.  What´s more, according to the views expressed by these authors, they are 
risk averse and, in average, their wages are lower than men´s.  Fearing divorce, and 
conscious to the fact that they are unable to recover the investment made in the family 
through court sentences, they unmistakably favor governments with strong redistributive 
programs. In short, it appears that Rawl´s principle stated in the often-cited expression veil 
of ignorance aptly mirrors women´s preferences. 
The role of self-interested pressure groups is present in this type of analysis.   
According to McCormick and Tollison (1981), there is an incentive to organize pressure 
groups whenever to receive one-dollar worth of benefits one has to spend less than that.  
This is precisely the mechanism that explains the exploration of large groups by small ones 
in a democracy where majority rule prevails.  A typical and often mentioned example is 
the agricultural sector in the E.U. and in other western democracies. 
Finally, ideology and the corresponding political orientation of the party in office is 
another explanatory variable commonly taken into consideration in this respect.  It is a 
subject well explored in the economic literature by authors such as the above-mentioned 
Nordhaus and Allesina. The prevailing notion is that governments from the left of the 
political spectrum are more expansionary and less fiscally responsible, easily engaging in 
policies leading to fiscal deficits, whereas governments supported by right wing parties are 
more conservative and responsible in managing public finances.  If so, we would expect 
public spending to rise when parties from the left control the government, and the opposite 
if, instead, parties from the right are in power. 
Using a wider measure of government spending than the ones usually employed, our 
goal is to investigate the actual influence of some of the above-mentioned factors on 
public spending by means of Johansen´s cointegration approach. 
2.   The model and the data set  
The particular contribution of this paper is to inquiry on the explanatory ability of 
economic, social and political variables related to a few of the above-mentioned 
theoretical approaches to increasing government spending. We do so by means of a 
single and parsimonious ad-hoc model where those variables are put together and its long-
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written as: 
1)     
 
Thus, the model investigates the specific influence of the following factors on the 
dependent variable G, which stands for public spending: a) GDP; b) elderly population 
(POP65); c) women (WOM); d) population occupied in agriculture (POPAGR); e) the 
political ideology of the government (GOVLEFT).   is the white noise term. 
An estimated, and statistically significant, coefficient for  g r e a t e r  t h a n  1 ,  i s  
evidence in support of Wagner´s law; instead, if it is negative and statistically significant, G 
becomes a government instrumental policy variable in the very Keynesian tradition. As far 
as the other coefficients are concerned we expect  ,   and   to be positive and 
statistically significant in order to support demand-based theories. Finally,    is positive if the 
government is from the left, and negative otherwise.  
In the particular case of population employed in agriculture, a negative coefficient 
is also plausible but then subject to quiet a different interpretation. Farmers would no longer 
stand as a pressure group imposing their self-interests on the government, but rather as a 
closely interdependent social community committed to solidarity practices among them. If 
this last scenario applies, the higher the relative weight of these individuals in the whole 
population the lower the need for government support in the usual form of transfer 
payments. But then, as agriculture looses economic and social importance, migration to 
urban areas imposes new obligations and expenses on the government as those closely 
knit community social bonds dissolve. 
 We use time series data sets made up of annual observations. G is Total General 
Government Expenditure; it includes spending in consumption, capital formation, interest 
and transfer payments from all government levels or sectors (central, state, and local 
governments where applicable, and social security funds). Because it embraces all 
government expenditures, without exceptions, we believe this measure reflects public 
spending and government influence more accurately than the alternative of only a few 
sectors being taken into consideration. G and GDP are measured in national currency at 
constant OECD 2002 base year prices. The data set relative to these two variables comes 
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individuals aged 65 years old or more as a percentage of total population. The variable 
women should exclude females still with no voting rights due to their youth, and women 
aged at least 65 years old. Following Lott and Kenny, we refer to relatively young women 
who hold real political influence as they attempt to hedge risks that may occur during their 
active lives and beyond. Consequently, we thought it most appropriate to measure WOM 
as female´s share in total civilian employment, so much so that those are the ones who 
have the best opportunities to be politically engaged through unions or other politically or 
socially motivated organizations. POPAGR is civilian employment in agriculture as a 
percentage of total civilian employment. Data for POP65, WOM and POPAGR comes from 
Population and Labour Force Statistics Vol 2008 release 01 (oecd-
stats.ingenta.com/OECD/TableViewer/tableView.aspx). Finally, the Comparative Political 
Data Set 1960-2005, by Armingeon, K. et al. provides  a quantitative measurement to 
GOVLEFT. The political orientation of the government is given in a continuous numerical 
scale from 0 to 100, depending on its composition. We use the observations in the sixth 
column of that data set (gov_left) except for Canada because it is equal to zero all the 
time and, consequently, we use the observations in the fourth column (gov_right). Finally, 
all variables are in logarithms except for the government political orientation in view of the 
fact that it includes zeros. Except for GOVLEFT , the estimated coefficients are elasticities of 
government spending with respect to the independent variables.  
Unfortunately, the OECD data sets length varies significantly from country to country 
which is especially true in the case of the dependent variable G. Strangely enough, in view 
of the economic and political relevance of this variable, there is not a considerable 
number of observations available. In so being, it is rather limited the number of countries 
whose data sets contains a reasonable number of observations to make feasible the 
empirical testing of the proposed model. The countries selected are Australia and Canada.  
The criterion for country selection was the availability of a reasonable amount of data and 
their ability to fulfill all the statistical prerequisites imposed by the Johansen methodology.  
Australia is the country with the largest number of observations since its data set begins in 
1960; for Canada, it begins in 1970 and ends in 2006. Accordingly, the conclusions are 
highly dependent upon the behavior of the variables concerned during this not very long 
period of time. However, we can point out to the following advantages: 1) we will extract 
conclusions from information relative to recent experience, and 2) we won´t observe 
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series data sets. The tables below summarize some basic statistics of the variables. 
Table 1- Government Expenditure (G) 
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Table 2- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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Table 3- ELDERLY POPULATION (POP65) 
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Table 5- POPULATION OCCUPIED IN AGRICULTURE (POPAGR) 
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*- In the case of Canada it is GOVDTA 
3.  The Empirical Methodology and the Results 
The purpose of the empirical research is to investigate the existence and direction of 
a long-run relationship between dependent and independent variables through 
cointegration analysis. As a prerequisite, one must begin by studying the stationary 
properties of the individual time series because cointegration is only admissible if they are 
all integrated of the same order. To detect the integrating order of the variables of the 
model, we resort to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test procedure. Table 7 shows the 
ADF results for each one of them, both in levels as in first differences. The ADF tests are 
performed for the hypothesis of a constant and a trend for all variables except government 
ideology. GOVLEFT assumed no constant and no trend. 
Table 7 – ADF Tests of Unit Roots 
LEVEL FORM  FIRST DIFFERENCES FORM   
COUNTRIES 
 
VARIABLES  With Constant 
and Trend 
With No constant 
and No Trend 
With Constant 
and Trend 
With No constant 
and No Trend 
G  -1.60   -5.53*   
GDP  -2.35   -5.58*   
POP65  -3.34  -1.66  
WOM  -2.26   -5.45*   





GOVLEFT   -1.54   -5.70* 
G -1.46  -5.03*  
GDP -3.44    -4.13*   
POP65 0.44    -4.82*   
WOM  -0.90   -4.15*   





GOVDTA   -1.35    -5.24* 
*     Statistically significant at the 1% level; **   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
Based on MacKinnon´s critical values at the 5% level of significance we conclude as 
follows: 
a)  for Australia, the reported ADF tests show that, with the sole exception of elderly 
population, the null hypothesis of a unit root was not rejected for the variables in 
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I(1); 
b)  for Canada all variables are I(1).   
The practical implication of the results just reported is that, for Australia, the variable 
POP65 should be excluded from the cointegration test. 
Recent literature indicates that panel-based unit root tests have higher power than 
the usual tests on individual time series. Even though these other tests are commonly 
referred to as panel unit root tests, under a theoretical point of view they are nothing but 
multiple-series unit root tests. We perform the Levin, Lin and Chu t* test in order to check for 
the correctness of the diagnosis just produced and, accordingly, of the soundness of the 
conclusions coming from the Johansen tests we intend to carry on. 
Table 8 – Levin, Lin and Chu tests for Models 1 and 2. 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root (assumes common unit root process) 






AUSTRALIA  1ST DIFFERENCE  -13.10* 
   






CANADA  1ST DIFFERENCE  -9.14* 
 
All the results reported in table 8 fail to reject the null-hypothesis for the variables in 
levels, but do so when they are in first differences, thus confirming the previous diagnosis. 
The next step is to decide on the correct lag order for the Johansen cointegration 
test in order to avoid distorted results due to misspecification. To this end, we apply Akaike´s 
Information Criterion (AIC) to a VAR model specification of all the variables concerned for 
each one the countries taken individually. Table 9 below presents those results. 
Table 9 – VAR Lag Order Selection for the Model 
 LAGS  AIC  statistic 
AUSTRALIA 1  -11.11 
 2  -11.19* 
 3  -10.68 
CANADA 1  -21.27 
 2  -21.66 
 3  -22.30* 
*indicates the lag order selected by the criterion. 
We investigate the null hypothesis of a long-run relationship among the variables by 
means of Johansen´s (1991) multivariate technique based on maximum-likelihood 
estimation. This technique is capable of identifying several cointegrating vectors and is 
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normalized cointegrating estimated coefficients for the model proposed. 
The results of the cointegrating tests for each one of the countries are displayed in 
Table 10. The number of cointegrating vectors, R, is set by the trace statistic, in conjunction 
with the critical values provided by MacKinnon-Michelis (1999). 
Table 10 – Johansen´s Cointegration Tests for Long-Run Relationships in the Model 
AUSTRALIA 
THE MODEL:  
Null Hypothesis  Trace Statistic  Eigenvalues  5% Critical Values 
R=0 *  83.70  0.57  76.97 
R≤1 49.63 0.49 54.08 
R≤2 22.66 0.22 35.19 
R≤3 12.81 0.18 20.26 
R≤4 4.83 0.11 9.16 
 
CANADA 
THE MODEL:   
Null Hypothesis  Trace Statistic  Eigenvalues  5% Critical Values 
R=0* 403.21 0.98 103.85 
R≤1* 279.01 0.95  76.97 
R≤2* 182.44 0.92  54.08 
R≤3* 101.99 0.89  35.19 
R≤4* 32.70 0.48 20.26 
R≤5* 11.78 0.31  9.16 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level of significance 
At the 5% level of significance there is only one cointegrating vector in the case of 
Australia.  However, for Canada there are multiple cointegrating vectors, which confirm 
the existence of a long-run relationship among the variables. However, since these results 
imply serious difficulties of interpretation, we re-estimate the model for this country. The re-
estimation strategy is to delete from the model each one of the explanatory variables, one 
at a time, until we arrive at a single cointegrating vector. Having done this, multiple 
cointegrating vectors disappear if we exclude women. We display all relevant statistics for 
the shorter explanatory model on Canada in table 11. 
Table 11 – Statistics for CANADA for the Shorter Explanatory Model of Government Spending 
LAG STRUCTURE  LAGS AIC  statistic 
CANADA 1  -12.59* 
 2  -12.22 
 3  -12.38 
 
CANADA´S Johansen´s Cointegration Tests for Long-Run Relationships in the Shorter Model of Eq.(1) 
THE MODEL:  
Null Hypothesis  Trace Statistic  Eigenvalues  5% Critical Values 
R=0* 100.98 0.76  76.97 
R≤1 52.27 0.46 54.08 
R≤2 31.05 0.39 35.19 
R≤3 14.09 0.21 20.26 
R≤4 6.15 0.17 9.16 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level of significance 
  10 4.  The Results 
Given the need to fulfill all the right properties imposed by the cointegration test, it 
has become clear in the previous section that we cannot test the model in its whole 
dimension, as initially proposed. In any case, the role played by each of the variables 
considered is estimated, if not for both countries, at least for one of them, putting into 
evidence that, indeed, there exists a long-run relationship among the variables.  Table 12 
displays the normalized cointegrated coefficients estimated for the variables, which are the 
long-run equilibrium coefficients for the detected relationships, as well as their t-statistics. 












































* Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; 
Since in the case of Canada WOM was withdrawn from the estimation of the 
cointegrating coefficients, we now apply the Johansen technique to an even shorter 
model where we explore the influence of this single independent variable on Canadian G. 
The next table reports the required statistics. 







Johansen´s Cointegration Tests for Long-Run Relationships 
Null Hypothesis  Trace Statistic  Eigenvalues  5% Critical Values 
R=0* 20.55 0.36 20.26 
R≤1  4.73 0.13 9.16 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level of significance 



















* Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; 
The set of results just reported on the long-run coefficients are very interesting with 
respect to their signs and statistical significance. With respect to GDP, we detect a 
  11 negative relationship with government expenditures, lending support to the Keynesian 
perspective. Indeed, following the generalized interpretation of Walra´s law, it would be 
improbable to detect a positive relationship because that law applies only to developing 
economies, which is not the case for any of the countries here. Furthermore, they are highly 
significant and greater than 1 in absolute value. 
The influence of women goes in the direction pointed out by Lott and Kenny. In 
every case, it is positive and, interesting enough, highly significant.  The same is true with 
population aged at least 65 years old.  
For Australia and Canada, population occupied in agriculture exerts a negative 
influence on government spending, but it is statistically significant only for Canada. In short, 
we do not find evidence supporting the idea that farmers organize themselves as an 
effective pressure group.  
Finally, with respect to ideology, the reported results prove that both in Australia and 
in Canada the relationship between the variables is negative and significant in spite of the 
fact that governments exhibit opposite ideological orientations. Indeed, it is as if in the 
period and in these two countries governments were constrained to act to control 
spending, no matter their political ideologies.  
5.  THE SHORT‐RUN DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESS 
It is convenient to explore the short-run dynamics of the process towards its long-run 
equilibrium in the presence of shocks in the dependent variables.  There are various 
econometric methods to accomplish this goal, such as error correction models, variance 
decomposition and impulse responses.  Succinctly we will look at the vector of information 
provided by these three methods. 
Given that the linear combination among the variables is stationary, we construct an 
Error Correction Model (ECM) based on the appropriate lag specifications and 
cointegrating coefficients estimated previously.  The following equation shows the ECM 




  12 The number of time lags, 1 or 2, actually depends upon the AIC statistics shown in 
tables 9 and 11; ∆ is the first difference operator, ECT is the estimated error correction term 
obtained from the long-run cointegration relationships via de Johansen maximum 
likelihood procedure, and μ are serially uncorrelated random error terms with zero mean. 
The estimated values for the speed of adjustment γ12 are reported in table 15 as well as 
other statistics. 






    
Adjusted R‐squared  0.22 0.21 
SSR  0.021 0.02 
F‐statistic  2.12 2.78 
Log likelihood  94.03 78.44 
 
The estimated ECM model reveals very low speeds of adjustment, most especially in 
the case of Canada.  One possible explanation for this result is the presence of a relatively 
large number of structural variables in the model which, by definition,  change only slowly 
through time.  These results are confirmed by the variance decomposition approach and 
by impulse responses reported below at the end of a ten-year period.   
Table 16 – Variance Decomposition for G - Australia 
Period  G  GDP  WOM  POPAGR  GOVLEFT 
10 73.90  12.75  8.09 0.06 5.20 
 
Table 17 – Accumulated Response of G to Each of the Variables - Australia 
Period  G  GDP  WOM  POPAGR  GOVLEFT 
10 0.4735  0.1554  0.1503  -0.004  -0.049 
 
Table 18 – Variance Decomposition for G - Canada 
Period  G  GDP  POP65  POPAGR  GOVDTA 
10 63.63  26.35  2.53 7.39  0.097 
 
Table 19 – Accumulated Response of G to Each of the Variables - Canada 
Period  G  GDP  POP65  POPAGR  GOVDTA 
10  0.3338 0.1875 0.0612 0.0978 0.0046 
 
The variance decompositions uncover the fraction of the movements in the 
dependent variable due to their own shocks, versus shocks to the other variables; they are 
  13 shown in tables 16 and 18 at the end of a ten-year period.  One can see that even though 
government spending is comparatively the more exogenous of the variables under 
consideration, it is nonetheless influenced, to a lesser or greater extent, by movements in 
the remaining variables of the model. GDP explains 12.75% or 26.35%, depending on the 
specific country, of the variance over a 10-year forecast horizon, whereas women explain 
8.09%, POP65 explain 2.53% and so on.  A similar pattern emerges from the impulse 
response functions, which show the effect of a unit shock, applied separately to the error of 
each equation. These especially reveal the very low speeds of adjustment; actually, after a 
10-year period the response of the systems were below 50%; that is, the shocks work 
throughout the system rather slowly.  
6.  Conclusions 
We use an all-inclusive measure of government spending and test for a long-run 
relationship with a few variables pertaining to various theoretical approaches to the 
explanation of those expenditures.  Based on the results obtained for the countries in the 
sample, Australia and Canada, with recourse to Johansen ´s methodology we obtain 
estimates for GDP, women and elderly population with the correct signs and statistically 
significant.  On the other hand; the influence played by farmers is significant only in one 
instance and its sign is negative thus not lending support to the thesis that they organize as 
a pressure group.  In what concerns government ideology, its political orientation seems to 
be irrelevant on how the manage public finances, which is probably due to either the 
specific characteristics of these countries or to the time period we studied. 
Besides, the adjustment process in the short-run is very slow no matter the 
econometric technique used for such an evaluation.  The result cannot be said to be 
surprising given the fact that we deal with variables that, in many cases, are structural in 
nature.   
It would be highly interesting to enlarge this research to a larger number of countries 
belonging to different geographic regions and, therefore, with quite different historic and 
cultural backgrounds. 
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- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ 1 ￿9 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿3 ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#1 ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; " / ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
  ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿0￿
#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ! ￿ / ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ " )￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ! ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿4 5 ￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! & ￿ ￿￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- / ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ " ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ 1 ￿9 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿9 ￿0 ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ = ! ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ 1 ￿9 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ; / ￿￿￿￿ ￿ = ! ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( / ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ = ! ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " )￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ = ! ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ " )￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ = ! ￿ )￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>￿0 ￿< ￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿? ￿" ! ￿￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿! 8 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿
, A ￿B ￿ A , A ￿￿￿￿ = = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿/ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿A / ￿ ￿ ￿ )￿ / " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ )￿ ￿ ! C ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ " ! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿
< ￿ " / ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿3 1 ￿ 1 ( 1 ￿￿ ￿ " ! ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ " ! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿#1 ￿￿ 1 ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿ 1 ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ " ! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿0￿
￿￿ ! ￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿D ￿ = ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ " ! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿
￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; " / ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿,? ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ,
! & ￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿D ￿ . " ￿#1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ! ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿@ ￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿ E ￿￿ ￿ ! 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
- / ! $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ )￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ " ￿F￿ ￿ ￿ G￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿#1 ￿￿ 1 ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; " / ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % % ￿
& ￿ ’ " ￿( ￿￿ )￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
" ￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % + ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿
/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % 0￿
9 ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ 1 ￿9 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ .￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿@ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % 4 ￿
9 ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿#1 ￿, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, 1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ H ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 I 1 ￿I ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ )￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿￿- / ! $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ " ￿F￿ ￿ ￿ G￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; " / ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,￿ ￿,￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ 1 ￿9 ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿
9 ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿#￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿.￿ ￿￿=￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿6 ￿￿￿B ￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C D E C ￿￿￿￿C D E F ￿￿￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿J ￿ ￿￿ * " ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿/ 8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿3 ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ # ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿/ 8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + % ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿? ￿ + ￿￿￿￿G ￿￿  ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿.￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + + ￿
￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿0 ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿.￿ ￿￿6 ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + 0￿
K ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿=￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿@ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + 4 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿#1 ￿￿ 1 ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " * ￿, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% % ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ + ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿3 ￿￿ / 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿ / ￿ " / ￿ ￿< ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ " ￿￿1 / ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! H % ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿